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Abstract:  This paper will review the emergence and adoption of decision heuristics 
as a conceptual framework within the avalanche research and education commu-
nity and demonstrate how this emphasis on the heuristic decision framework has 
anchored and was critical in redefining the discussion around avalanche accidents. 
This paradigm has been a critical and meaningful step in recognizing the impor-
tance of decision making in avalanche accidents. However, in an attempt to reduce 
the incidence of fatal accidents, the adoption of these ideas within the wider 
avalanche community has overlooked some clearly stated limitations within the 
foundational work of the heuristic decision frame. With respect to the concept of 
heuristic traps in conventional avalanche education, the concepts are poorly oper-
ationalized to the extent that they are vague about what exactly they describe. The 
result is that as presently framed, they are of negligible value to avalanche educa-
tion that seeks its basis on the best available information. We end with a discussion, 
and a call to action to the avalanche research community, of how we could move 
towards resolution of these weaknesses and add value to prior work on human 
factor research. Our aim is not to disparage the seminal, paradigm shifting work by 
McCammon, but rather draw attention to how it has been operationalized and how 
the industry needs to move beyond this paradigm to see further gains in our 
understanding of avalanche fatalities.
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1. Introduction
In the world’s alpine countries approximately 250 people die in avalanches every year (Schweizer 
et al., 2009); most occur in North America and Europe (Statham et al., 2018). Most of these are 
“accidents of choice” where victims willingly place themselves at risk during recreational or 
professional activities such as backcountry skiing, snowmobiling, mountaineering, or professional 
avalanche mitigation (Greene et al., 2006).1 The actual accident rate is likely to be decreasing over 
recent decades (e.g., Birkeland et al., 2017; Jekich et al., 2016).
Accidents are unfortunate incidents that happen unexpectedly and unintentionally. They are 
however, not random or unexplainable. The ultimate cause of an avalanche accident is failure of 
the snowpack and subsequent burial and/or injury or death. The precipitating factor that led to the 
failure, is that a person or group was in a position of risk with respect to avalanche hazard. Indeed, 
most avalanche accidents are “victim-triggered” (Avalanche Canada, 2018; Klassen et al., 2013) 
suggesting that some miscalculation preceded the event. Thus, the miscalculation is often due to 
a failure of decision processes that do not make full use of the victim’s informational assets 
(Arnott, 1998).
Up to 53 factors have been identified for decision making in avalanche terrain making it 
a complicated matter even for experts (Landrø, Hetland et al., 2019; Landrø, Pfuhl et al., 2019). 
Additionally, avalanche related decisions are influenced by a range of external factors such as; 
environmental, organizational, and demographic. The examination of (failed) decision heuristics 
has dominated the inquiry into decision processes that result in avalanche accidents for the past 
two decades (Adams, 2005; Atkins, 2000; Fredston et al., 1994; Furman et al., 2010; Grímsdóttir & 
Mcclung, 2006; Haegeli et al., 2010; Haegeli & Strong-Cvetich, 2018; Hendrikx et al., 2016, 2014; 
Johnson et al., 2016; Mannberg et al., 2018a; Marengo et al., 2017; McCammon, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2009; McClung, 2002; Silverton et al., 2009; Statham et al., 2018; Tremper, 2008; Zweifel et al., 
2012). In North America, the findings from these studies have been adopted in a wide range of 
avalanche education courses, awareness programs, magazine articles and online feature articles 
(Page, 2014, 2015). The avalanche education community has used the term “human factors” to 
include errors in judgement and social dynamics to explain the decision processes of why people 
die in avalanches (Atkins, 2000; Furman et al., 2010; Maguire, 2014; McCammon, 2002, 2004, 2009; 
McClung, 2002). However, it is a mistake to assume that only factors within the heuristic traps 
framework account for the full complexity of human factors in avalanche decision making.
This paper will review the emergence and adoption of decision heuristics within the avalanche 
research and education community and demonstrate how it has framed the discussion around 
avalanche accident causes. We then revisit the heuristics paradigm, highlighting some of the 
methodological deficiencies and how they could be addressed in order to enhance their explana-
tory power with respect to avalanche accidents. Finally, we present the research and education 
community with a proposal for future research to address these misunderstandings.
2. Background
2.1. Decision heuristics
Decision heuristics, mental processes used in decision making, are a fundamental way for people 
to reduce the effort of making a decision to arrive at satisfactory outcomes/solutions (Simon, 
1956). There are two major streams of research within the field of heuristics (Bobadilla-Suarez & 
Love, 2018; Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2016; Raue & Scholl, 2018; Simon, 1990; Zajchowski et al., 
2016). One is the “heuristic and biases” program—the study of systematic biases in decisions and, 
the “fast and frugal” program where heuristics are demonstrated to be a very effective and precise 
decision-making tool (Kahneman, 2003, p. 1449). Both recognize that people employ limited 
information, time, and/or processing power/cognitive resources to seek a satisfactory rather than 
optimal decision. (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2016). Fast and frugal 
heuristics have been demonstrated to be as accurate or better than rational decision making 
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under some conditions. However, the heuristics and bias program also demonstrates circum-
stances under which heuristics trade off some accuracy for less effort (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).
Both schools of heuristic thought share the constraint of bounded rationality: that people must 
make decisions within the limits of both their cognitive resources (knowledge, skills and abilities) 
and their environment (time and information). These natural limits to our decision-making powers 
and the available evidence about the objective state of the world are most important for decision 
making in avalanche terrain that is, there is a good deal of inherent uncertainty and the prob-
abilities of snowpack failure are seldom absolutely known. Outcomes can only be subjectively, or at 
best probabilistically determined.
Heuristics simplify the amount of information individuals process by relying on memories based 
on past experience and simple algorithms to look for decision clues. They rely on less information, 
and they examine fewer alternatives (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Heuristic decision making is 
not, in itself, a flawed decision process (Klein, 2015). However, we sometimes employ heuristics at 
the risk of making an even better decision (Frame, 2012; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Kahneman, 
2011; De Martino et al., 2006; Slovic et al., 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1978). This may 
happen when there is a perception that time or cognitive load is constrained (Zhao et al., 1987), 
the consequence of a mistake is low (Sherman & Corty, 1984), or emotion overrides logic (Tiedens 
& Linton, 2001).
Avalanche terrain is a “wicked learning environment”, i.e., one in which feedback from decisions 
in the form of outcomes (i.e. avalanche incidents) are misleading or missing and asymmetric; poor 
decisions do not always result in avalanche incidents. Because so few avalanche accidents occur, 
feedback from our decision processes is not robust and so conclusions based on the analysis of 
failure must be considered circumspect. This is in contrast to a “kind” learning environment 
(Hogarth et al., 2015) that foster improved analytical decision making because feedback is valid 
and robust. Both environments foster experience-based heuristic decision strategies. However, 
while the heuristics produced by kind learning environments are formed by highly informational 
experiences, those derived from a wicked learning environment rely on non-informative or false 
experiences (i.e. false stability). Heuristic decision strategies may be highly productive and efficient 
in-kind learning environments but may be useless or even detrimental in avalanche terrain where 
rather than asking “what are the chances for this specific slope to avalanche” (Hogarth et al.), we 
substitute the question for an easier one: “how readily does an experience of an avalanche 
incident come to mind” (Hogarth et al.). This ease of retrieval guides our decision but critical 
corrective feedback is missing (Schwartz, 2010).
2.2. Avalanche accident analysis
Avalanche accident reports have historically been examined along two lines—snowpack failure 
and human failure. The first approach looks to the physical structure of the snowpack to determine 
why an avalanche occurred. The second looks to the characteristics of victims and the decision 
process that placed them at risk. In this paper, we are mainly interested in the latter.
The factors analyzed in research on avalanche accidents can be divided into two broad groups: 
individual characteristics, e.g., gender, training, experience (Fredston et al., 1994; Grímsdóttir & 
Mcclung, 2006; Haegeli et al., 2010; Kobe & Jenkins, 1991; Sole et al., 2010) and behavioral factors, 
planning, avalanche forecast information-seeking behavior, communication, and decision making 
as skiers consider terrain constraints, changing weather, and snowpack conditions and express 
a range of adaptive behaviors in order to return home safely (Atkins, 2000; Jamieson et al., 2010; 
Johnson et al., 2016; McCammon, 2002, 2004; McCammon & Hägeli, 2004).
The two threads share a common finding that is; accidents are seldom caused by a lack of basic 
information regarding terrain, weather, and snowpack. Rather, accidents are a function of how 
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information about terrain, weather, and snowpack uncertainty is processed within the context of 
social or personal bias. The avalanche education community uses the term borrowed from indus-
trial risk management “human factors” to mean errors in human judgement and the social 
dynamics that result in avalanche accidents.
Fredston and Fesler introduced the concept of human factors associated with avalanche acci-
dents as early as 1994 (Fredston et al., 1994). Atkins followed with analysis of fatal accidents in 
North America during the 1990s and pointed to accidents being the result of human errors, with 
the great majority being considered as judgment errors rather than errors in skill or knowledge and 
identified a set of elements that he thought had contributed to the accidents (over-confidence, 
anti-authority, impulsivity, and invulnerability, group management, complacency, and poor com-
munication) (Atkins, 2000).
McCammon analyzed 622 recreational accidents involving 1180 individuals that occurred in the 
US between 1972 and 2001 (McCammon, 2002).2 Data were derived primarily from the Colorado 
Avalanche Information Center accident database (McCammon, 2002). He pointed to several 
heuristics skiers misapply while making decisions in avalanche terrain. He termed these “heuristic 
traps”. He was the first to apply these concepts as an effort to understand avalanche accidents 
(Furman et al., 2010).
Accident data can provide valuable information about the causes of an accident but it is 
a mistake to use it to develop any theory about decision-making processes exclusively. Many 
industries collect accident data as an effort to model accident causes but such data are the source 
of several inherent biases that can distort conclusions. Among these are: sampling bias, base rate 
bias, analysis bias, the group-wise comparison bias and the hindsight bias. McCammon acknowl-
edged many of these issues in his exploratory work. Below, we define and discuss the implications 
of these limitations for avalanche accident analysis.
2.2.1. Sampling bias
Accident reports are a form of convenience sampling. They represent a biased sample based on 
available data rather than a representative sample that reflects the true range and frequency of 
behavior among all backcountry travelers. With respect to avalanche accidents, they describe only 
reported accidents—typically where rescue or medical treatment was involved. Caution should be 
exercised when generalizing those conclusions to a population outside the mainstream study 
population. For example, one should not draw generalizations to the whole of the backcountry 
skiing population from accident data; those involved in avalanche accidents represent a narrow 
and rare part of the spectrum of the skiing experience. Undoubtedly, avalanche accidents occur 
and go unreported because the outcome did not result in a fatality and so fall outside the sample/ 
analysis. Furthermore, there are untold incidents of incorrect risk judgements that do not results in 
an avalanche being triggered and therefore provide no feedback. Luck rather than correct judge-
ment prevails, but we do not obtain any data on what decision errors were made or how, so 
analysis is problematic if not impossible.
2.2.2. Base rate fallacy/neglect
Base rate fallacy/neglect is the strong tendency to favor specific diagnostic information while 
disregarding or underweighting general base rate probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the case of explaining decision failures that result in avalanche 
accidents we do not know the overall population frequencies for skiers and riders and the 
subgroups (i.e., how many men vs. women, trained vs. untrained, or the skill level of groups of 
skiers) that are touring in avalanche terrain. Without that data we cannot draw conclusions about 
groups as represented in the accident data. Suppose that 75 percent of all backcountry riders are 
males. This means that all things being equal such as education levels, experience, etc., we should 
expect to see more avalanche accidents among males because they are over-represented in the 
backcountry population. If many males show up in the accident data, it is not necessarily 
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evidenced that males take more risk than women or that they engage in more flawed decision 
making. Similarly, if individuals who seek avalanche training have a greater interest in backcountry 
touring, and therefore spend more days in the backcountry than do individuals who do not seek 
avalanche training, then unless the education gains can fully off-set the increased temporal 
exposure, we should expect to see more victims with avalanche training than without. 
A relatively higher rate of accidents among those with avalanche education should not lead us 
to the conclusion that those with education make worse decisions. The base rate problem is 
overcome by knowing the distribution for each category in the group—i.e. gender, training, number 
of days skiing, time in potentially hazardous terrain, etc., and calculating the probability of each 
group being in an accident.
Likewise, in order to assess the role and failure/success of heuristic-based decisions, we also need to 
know the true frequency (base rate) of the use of heuristics in the population. Just because certain 
heuristics appear to have been used in decision processes that led to accidents, it does not follow that 
the heuristic failure necessarily caused the accident. It could be that 99% of all skiers used the same 
heuristic decision processes so the heuristics will obviously appear in accident analysis.
2.2.3. Analysis bias
Accident report data is historical and often consolidated longitudinally. If some variable changes 
over time with respect to accident causes, we may miss the effects of that change if models either 
do not take into account these changes or they are not designed to adjust temporally.
In the McCammon data some of the cases happened 30 years before the analysis yet the 
analysis treats all accidents temporally the same. These shifts in the accident rate and causes 
are the source of some discussion in the literature (K. Birkeland, 2016; K. W. Birkeland et al., 2017; 
Jekich et al., 2016). Most important, the number of backcountry skiers and snowmobilers increased 
over the past two decades and so increased the pool available for accident victims. Snowmobile 
technology improved providing easier access to extreme terrain both for skiers and snowmobilers. 
Conversely, avalanche education became more widespread and available and more forecast 
centers meant there was more and higher quality information for the public. Greater media 
attention provided social rewards for skiing hazardous terrain (i.e. social cues). Safety equipment 
(beacons, airbag packs) meant recovery from an accidents increased survival/injury rates and so 
the accident may not appear in accident data (Haegeli et al., 2014; Ng et al., 2015).
Accidents are analyzed as ensembles rather than temporally (Wilde, 1988). The difference is that for 
phenomena that exhibit a varying trajectory over time, as with avalanche accidents (K. W. Birkeland 
et al., 2017), ensemble analysis frameworks are not satisfactory and discrete periods need to be 
identified and defined to explain how casual relationships may change over time.
2.2.4. Group-wise comparison bias
The nature of accident data is that one cannot always distinguish individual decisions within the 
group from collective decisions made by the group. Nor can it identify the role of specific individual 
traits of the decision maker (Adams, 2005). This is referred to as the level of analysis problem 
(Bartholomew et al., 2008). Behaviors are attributed to the group when in fact, one individual may 
have been instrumental in the decision that resulted in a group accident. Analysis and conclusions 
from accidents reports often confuse the level of analysis by conflating both individual and group 
behaviors within the same accident.
2.2.5. Hindsight bias
Hindsight Bias is the inclination to declare an event as predictable when it is analyzed after the 
fact. This occurs because during the debriefing, information becomes available to those involved in 
the accident and/or those involved in its analysis. Decisions that made sense at the time may look 
different in hindsight. For example, avalanches are notoriously difficult to predict with precision at 
a spatial and temporal scale relevant for back country users, but no responsible forecast would 
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pinpoint the slope and time of a future avalanche event. However, after an accident, the incidence 
of the slide is known with certainty, thereby triggering the response of flawed decision-making i.e. 
the group chose to ski an unstable slope. Backcasting the avalanche hazard or the weather data, 
there is a tendency to place blame of the accident on the existence of information that may not 
have existed at the time of the accident. It is therefore easy to mistakenly conclude certain causal 
relations in the decision process when in fact each step in that decision process may not have been 
knowable at the time of the decision.
3. Avalanche accidents and decision bias
3.1. Heuristics and heuristic traps in avalanche accidents review
McCammon first identified four potential factors he suggested have influenced the decisions of 
avalanche victims: familiarity, social proof, commitment and scarcity (McCammon, 2002). He later 
developed the acronym “FACETS” that included two additional factors (i.e. Expert Halo and 
Acceptance). Although McCammon identified them as heuristic traps most of them are not 
heuristics by definition, but rather represent a bundle of decision biases or habits that may lead 
to decision errors. Briefly, McCammon’s description for each are:
F= Familiarity—our past actions to guide our behavior in a familiar setting. You’ve skied this 
slope a dozen times and it’s never slid, so despite obvious avalanche warning signs, you ski it 
again this time. 
A=Acceptance—tendency to engage in activities that we think will get us noticed or 
accepted by people we like or respect. You want to impress others in the group, and this 
causes you to overlook warning signs. 
C=Consistency—an initial decision about something, subsequent decisions are much easier 
if we maintain consistency with previous decisions. i.e. …. we’re determined to ski this slope 
no matter what … 
E=Expert Halo—trusting an informal leader, who ends up making critical decisions for the 
ski group that may not make the most prudent one. 
T= First tracks. This refers to scarcity, the tendency to value resources or opportunities in 
proportion to the chance that you may lose them. For backcountry skiers, wanting to ski 
untouched powder adds to the excitement and so skiers may ignore avalanche warning signs. 
S= Social Facilitation presence of other people enhances risk-taking by a subject. Fresh tracks 
on the slope encourage one toward safe conditions even through avalanche danger is high. 
McCammon provided only cursory discussion of the derivation of FACETS in the footnotes 
(McCammon, 2004) depending primarily on the work of Tversky and Kahneman and their work 
on decision bias (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1978). FACETS is important to understand because it aids in the future operationaliza-
tion and investigation of variables associated with each decision bias and provides in-depth 
explanation of the behavioral and psychological underpinnings of each. Table 1 summarizes the 
definitions of each FACET and provides an example of how it manifests in the backcountry skiing 
setting.
McCammon made a seminal contribution to the understanding of avalanche accidents by 
placing failure in the context of human factors, although he mislabeled several of them as decision 
heuristics and potential heuristic traps. For the most part he is describing biases, habits, behaviors, 
and group dynamics rather than computation-saving decision short cuts. His analysis is appro-
priate to the nature of the data available at the time and he is explicit about its limitations. 
However, like any emergent scientific idea there is room for improvement.
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Given the ubiquity of his work in avalanche education and the media, it is easily forgotten that 
McCammon (2002, 2004) is speaking of the narrow sample of fatal avalanche accidents using data 
available to him at the time. His work never suggested that these factors were predictive of accidents 
for all groups, and he is clear that he is not generalizing to the whole of the ski population suggesting 
their decision processes are not effective. Neither is he assuming to propose a definitive answer to the 
causes of avalanche accidents. He explicitly recognizes that there may be variables as yet unidenti-
fied that contribute to accidents. Below we propose to focus on the specification and measurement of 
FACETS in order to provide a well-understood foundation upon which researchers can build. Our 
suggestions are intended to begin to overcome the above-mentioned limitations of the existing 
FACTS paradigm.
3.2. Operationalization of heuristics in the avalanche community
Central to any research is the ability to operationalize variables—the process of strictly defining 
concepts with measurable factors. The process defines ambiguous concepts and allows them to be 
measured, empirically and quantitatively. Unless we are specific about how we measure our 
observations they cannot be replicated by others, in other settings, and under different conditions. 
Many of the terms used in FACETS can be more effectively operationalized and more easily 
understood for use in future research. We present two specific examples to illustrate:
(i) Familiarity—our past actions guide our behavior in a familiar setting. Relevant measures must 
include agreement on the definition of “familiar”. How many times must one visit a slope in order 
for it to be considered familiar; what is familiar about it—terrain, snowpack conditions; for whom 
was the slope familiar—all the group, one of the group? What is the scale of familiarly—is it run 
contingent, locality, or regional? Some of these terms can be placed on a scale that could indicate 
the degree of familiarity. Table 2 delineates variables for operationalizing “Familiarity”. Finally, 
familiar may be a synonym for habit—the process of automaticity and reduced deliberation, 
analysis, and volition. An example would be the use of the “normal” skin track approach to 
a slope regardless of snowpack conditions. These terms, if they are to be used in formal statistical 
analysis, need to be specified to the extent that the work can be replicated.
(ii) Social Facilitation—describes how the presence of other individuals encountered during the 
tour can both improve and deteriorate humans’ performance on different tasks. This can begin 
with the nature of the encounter—was it used to encourage competition and risk taking or was it 
used as an opportunity for information gathering or friendly social interaction. Was the interaction 
in person or observed? Where the people encountered known to the other group, if so, how? Social 
interaction effects are understood to be important in language learning, addiction treatment, and 
media viewing and can be measured using in-person field surveys.
Each of the decision biases discussed above are thought by their user to be rational in terms of 
making efficient and effective choices; rational people tend to frame their decisions in logical 
Table 2. Operationalization of Familiarity Heuristic
Variable Dimensions Metric
Familiarity of slope Number of times skied by 
a member of the group/ 
individual
Frequency, scale (i.e. trail, slope, drainage basin).
Experience Real or virtual information (e.g., detailed guide, Goggle 
earth, maps and photos). In person or verbal report/web 
page. Time of year.
Attributes of destination Local trail head, clearly demarked trail, ease of access, 
recognizable place name.
Temporal dimensions Last visited, change in 
snowpack conditions.
Johnson et al., Cogent Social Sciences (2020), 6: 1807111                                                                                                                                               
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2020.1807111                                                                                                                                                       
Page 9 of 18
terms (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). They also appear to have face validity that is; they appear to 
explain reality in terms of how people arrive at decisions (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gilovich 
et al., 2002; Kahneman et al., 1982; De Martino et al., 2006).
Even considering the caveats of sampling and population bias inherent in post hoc accident 
analysis, the importance of McCammon’s (2002, 2004) work for raising awareness of the human in 
avalanche accidents cannot be overstated. His analysis contributed to an important discussion of 
the causes of avalanche accidents. As we discuss in detail below, however, despite the short-
comings identified above, FACETS is widely used in avalanche courses, awareness courses and 
cited in the popular media. While some information is generally better than no information, 
incorrect or conflated results may reduce future advancement in avalanche education and, lead 
to confusion and misunderstanding. Below, we suggest a course of action that would address 
these shortcomings.
3.3. The future: refining the heuristic paradigm
The concepts contained in the FACETS framework are poorly operationalized to the extent that they 
are overly vague about what exactly they describe. This is largely a function of inadequate response by 
the research and education community to scrutinize and expand the research agenda rather than 
inherent weaknesses in McCammon’s original exploratory research. The avalanche education com-
munity appears to misunderstand the structural issues associated with the findings. They fail to 
understand the base rate problem and so tend to overstate the occurrence of decision errors in 
every day backcountry touring. By focusing on the occurrence of errors (i.e. accidents) they fail to 
understand their true rate for the skiing population as a whole and apply heuristics unreservedly.
Few studies have attempted to explicitly test the role of FACETS in non-accident settings. Two 
studies (Furman et al., 2010; Marengo et al., 2017) that have sought to do so rely on hypothetical 
scenarios to analyze decision-making in avalanche terrain. We chose to examine these studies in 
order to illustrate both the difficulty of FACETS evaluation due to the lack of operationalized 
variables and the lack of agreement on how to evaluate FACETS. Both studies use discrete choice 
experiments to identify the effects of the heuristic traps and incorporate avalanche education as 
variables in the analysis.
Furman et al. (2010) recruited 266 participants from AIARE level 1 avalanche courses in the 
United States and asked them to state the likelihood that they would ski a set of runs with a slope 
of 33°.3 Each participant read six descriptive vignettes that varied systematically in terms of 
avalanche hazard (low, moderate, considerable, high), and the presence of various FACETS. 
Below is an example question:
You are part of a group that is out for a day of backcountry skiing. The avalanche forecast 
states that the avalanche hazard is HIGH. You have chosen to ski terrain that YOU HAVE 
SKIED MANY TIMES BEFORE. You have a HIGH commitment to skiing the line you intend to 
ski. You are in a MIXED-gender group. There IS a clearly defined leader in your group 
suggesting you ski the slope. During your approach you saw NO other parties. You plan to ski 
an UNTRACKED slope. (Furman et al., 2010, p. 459) 
They employed hierarchical linear regression to test for the effects of FACETS. The first level model 
tested for effects of avalanche forecast and FACETS, while the second level model controlled for 
differences in individual risk propensity using the stimulating-instrumental risk inventory 
(Zaleskiewicz, 2001). Their results show that the most important factor for a high stated probability 
to ski the slope is the avalanche danger rating. However, they also find that if the participant was 
told that they had skied in the area many times before (i.e. Familiarity), was committed to the line 
(i.e. Consistency), were touring in a group with a clear leader who wanted to ski the line (i.e. Expert 
Halo), had planned to ski an untracked slope (i.e. First Tracks), and met others on the approach (i.e. 
Social Facilitation) they stated a higher probability of skiing the slope. They found no effect of 
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touring in a mixed gender group (i.e. Acceptance). All participants in this study were currently 
enrolled in a level one avalanche class so the explicit role of education was not tested.
A second study conducted in Northern Italy tested the effects of two heuristic traps (familiarity 
and tracks) (Marengo et al., 2017). Participants were recruited online (N = 376) and were presented 
with four vignettes describing ski runs that differed systematically in terms of avalanche hazard, 
slope, familiarity with the area, presence of tracks, and availability of avalanche equipment. An 
example scenario appears below:
You are out for a day of backcountry skiing and you have just reached the slope you 
intended to ski. Please rate the likelihood you would actually decide to ski the slope given 
the following characteristics: 
The forecasted avalanche danger for the area is HIGH. 
Your familiarity with the slope is LOW, YOU HAVE NEVER SKIED IT BEFORE. 
The slope is already TRACKED. 
The slope is QUITE STEEP (INCLINATION BETWEEN 35 AND 40 DEGREES). 
You HAVE an avalanche beacon, a probe and a shovel as part of your equipment. (Marengo 
et al., 2017, p. 80) 
The results of their regression analysis indicate the most important factor for participants’ choice 
to ski or not ski a slope is the forecasted avalanche hazard. Participants also stated a lower 
likelihood to ski a slope at steeper angles or if no avalanche equipment was available. They find 
that familiarity with the skiing area and pre-existing tracks on the slope increased the stated 
likelihood to ski the run (Marengo et al., 2017).
The goal of both research efforts was to test for the presence and relative importance of FACETS 
as operationalized separately by the two research groups. The results indicate that a set of well- 
articulated variables may play some role in the decision process. However there was a set of 
multiple variables contained in each scenario such that it is difficult to know what if any stand out 
as important drivers of the decision outcome.
Both projects sought to lend greater specificity to the FACETS variables. The fact that they both 
identified the forecasted avalanche hazard as being of primary importance in the go/no go 
decisions suggests that knowledge of a forecast plays an important role in the ski decision. This 
is a fundamental skill that is taught at the introductory classes. Both research efforts found 
evidence for the familiarity heuristic but, both studies left it undefined. Future surveys would 
benefit from exploring the concept of familiar terrain as discussed above.
Both also found evidence for the scarcity heuristic although each appear to have defined it 
differently. The first defined it (in the negative) as During your approach you saw NO other parties. 
You plan to ski an UNTRACKED slope (Furman et al., 2010). The other as: The slope is already 
TRACKED (Marengo et al., 2017) but makes no mention of meeting other parties—leaving out part 
of the definition of the variable as defined by McCammon. This points to the difficulty of having no 
generally accepted definition of the FACETS. Scarcity-related behavior could be initiated when one 
ski party meets another, it could be when they see tracks on the intended slope, it could be when 
both or neither occur. Does the number of tracks relative to the area of the slope matter? Does the 
ski quality for the day matter to feelings of scarcity?
Both studies demonstrate how progress toward operationalization of FACETS can proceed and 
how surveys of the general skiing population can elucidate behaviors and decisions when properly 
designed. Certainly there are differences between in-person surveys of daily tours and machine- 
based surveys but both can be used effectively to expand our knowledge of the decision processes 
of the skiing population (Chamarro et al., 2013; Dohmen et al., 2011; Fitzgerald et al., 2016; Furman 
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et al., 2010; Grímsdóttir & Mcclung, 2006; Haegeli et al., 2014, 2012; Haegeli & Strong-Cvetich, 
2018; Harvey et al., 2002; Hendrikx & Johnson, 2014, 2016; Hendrikx et al., 2016, 2013; Hendrikx 
et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 2016; Mannberg et al., 2018b; Marengo et al., 2017; Saly et al., 2020; 
Stamberger et al., 2018). Beyond the various survey designs, the experimental methods of psy-
chology offer a valuable methodological approach to empirically test hypotheses about human 
factors in decision making in avalanche terrain. They permit the study of causal relations between 
two variables while controlling for extraneous factors in order to clarify the principle drivers of the 
decision process.
We suggest a next step in skier survey design, analysis, and implementation could be for the 
research community to build a depository of questionnaire items to be used in surveys aimed at 
refining FACETS and other human factor frameworks. This is a common practice among social 
scientists in multiple subject areas (i.e. crime reports, health and dietary practices, learning out-
comes, political surveys and polls) where dimensions of a variable that could be measured in 
numerous ways are standardized across research questions.
For example, demographics, the statistical data relating to the population and particular 
groups within it, can include age, gender, employment status, group size, participation in 
outdoor activities, and skills (i.e. years skiing; experience in backcountry skiing; skill level with 
terrain management, avalanche transceiver, and snowpack assessment; avalanche education 
level) (Atkins, 2000; Bergeron et al., 2016; Harvey et al., 2002; Jamieson et al., 2010; Jekich 
et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2016; McCammon, 2002, 2004, 2009; McCammon & Hägeli, 2004; 
Simenhois & Savage, 2010). Likewise, a set of standardized decision framework questions could 
be formulated for use in decision analysis research aimed at skiers and riders. Such 
a coordinated effort would help us better understand the role of heuristics/human factors in 
decision making in avalanche terrain.
Standardized questionnaires produce some advantages that include (Kelley et al., 2003):
(1) Reliability—refers to consistency in how a question is asked and answered. Reliable ques-
tions measure a variable the same each time. A simple example is measuring body weight 
using the same metric (i.e. kilograms).
(2) Validity refers to how well a questionnaire can measure what it is intended to measure. 
Using the example above, all scales used to measure weights are accurate relative to each 
other. That is, a weight registered on one scale will be the same (±) on another scale.
(3) Sensitivity is how well the questionnaire can discriminate between differences in respon-
dents. When measuring body weight one kilo may be sensitive enough.
(4) Objectivity is the concept that all researchers can independently verify the measurement 
statements of others.
(5) Quantification is the manner in which a variable is measured. Quantification may be at the 
nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio level.
Other features of a question bank aimed to measure standardized concepts include efficiency for 
researchers when searching for methods to measure a variable. Finally, multiple findings can be 
compared spatially and temporally if methods and measures are standard.
In order to address the move toward a standard question bank for investigation of the multiple 
aspects of the social side of snow science we have designed and will launch a research-specific website 
for citizen scientists. The site, housed in the Montana State University Snow and Avalanche Laboratory 
(http://www.montana.edu/snowscience/researchaid.html), will lead those not trained in social science 
research through the process. One feature of the site will be a battery of standardized questions for 
investigating questions related to human dimensions of decision making in avalanche terrain.
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3.4. Need for this work
A credible question(s) from the education community could be: What are the costs of not refining 
the FACETS paradigm? If the goal is to avoid avalanche accidents what is the harm in potentially 
misunderstanding the causes?
First, it potentially skews the perception and curriculum of avalanche education by misplacing 
emphasis on behaviors that may not play an important role in accidents while other aspects may 
be deemphasized. At the same time, refinement could yield greater insights into the role of human 
factors in accidents and lead to more highly focused lessons for backcountry travelers. One specific 
example of this, is the recent work that points towards the increased age of avalanche fatalities in 
the USA in recent decades, which suggest a change in the critical target audience of avalanche 
educators (Peitzsch et al., 2020).
Second, it could weaken the role of education in the reduction of accidents. Clearly education is 
efficacious for teaching various skills and knowledge of avalanche terrain and there is no logical reason 
it should not do so for human factors (Gosbee & Anderson, 2003). DiGiacomo suggests that “letting the 
results of conditional statistical analysis (i.e. wrong results) morph into habits and rules of thumb is 
potentially … dangerous … Once these take hold, they become embedded in avalanche education 
programs and materials, and ultimately in the decision-making process of individual users” (DiGiacomo, 
2006). As they do, they may be very difficult to change due to organizational inertia and culture.
Finally, drawing the wrong lessons from avalanche accidents may occlude important underlying 
emergent patterns in accidents and skier behavior in general. It may be that the FACETS frame-
work is not the most effective one to use for analysis. An alternative framework could yield more 
effective insights. Framing around FACETS encourages us to use language and interpretations 
centered around decision failure when in fact, it could be that many of the decisions that resulted 
in accidents were attributable to a very different set of circumstances.
4. Summary and future directions
Over the last four decades, the avalanche accident investigation literature has evolved from 
a relatively one-dimensional snowpack assessment perspective to a comprehensive approach 
based on snowpack stability assessment and terrain features as well as an improved understand-
ing of decision processes, communication skills, and other behavioral dynamics of skiers and riders. 
Quality avalanche education courses reflect those developments.
Methods have evolved from descriptive surveys to incorporate user-friendly GPS tracking tech-
nology and innovative social science theory (Furman et al., 2010; Haegeli & Strong-Cvetich, 2018; 
Hendrikx & Johnson, 2014; Hendrikx, Shelly, Johnson, 2016). However, even the most sophisticated 
methods suffer from shortcomings; primary among them is convenience or non-probability sam-
pling that constrains generalization to the whole of the ski population. This is particularly acute 
when highly biased samples, such as accident data, are used to educate the overall ski population 
about avalanche accidents. While the heuristics paradigm was timely and seminal for this com-
munity it has been adopted with little critical review and analysis for more than 15 years.
The next phase of research could follow Maguire’s (2020) framework of formulating an integra-
tive approach for avalanche education where multiple dimensions of complex decisions in ava-
lanche terrain are better understood as a set of parallel and sometimes competing processes. 
Table 3 identifies and briefly defines her concepts.
The general acceptance of the heuristic traps frame in avalanche education is problematic 
given the lack of peer review in scientific journals, the lack of clear operationalization of its 
key variables, and so risks being misunderstood and misapplied in avalanche education. 
Backcountry skier behaviors are a cause for some accidents, but they cannot effectively be 
understood treating them as a homogeneous group across time and space. Rather, skiers, like 
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the accidents they are involved in, can be segmented using demographic and psychographic 
attributes. Behavioral concepts such as positionality may prove useful (Mannberg et al., 
2018a)
The study of accidents as the central consequence of backcountry skiing is problematic. The fact 
is most skiers never experience an avalanche incident and the accident rate seems to be decreas-
ing for all types of users. More attention should be placed on the successful implementation of best 
practices and researchers would be wise to move from emphasis on failure to emphasis on success 
and look beyond the heuristics traps paradigm. 
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Notes
1. Winter backcountry travelers may include skiers, 
snowboard riders, snowmobilers, and those traveling 
on snowshoes. In the interest of brevity, we use 
backcountry skiers as a catch all phrase to represent 
all potential backcountry winter recreationists.
2. McCammon later increased his number of cases to 715 
and included years up through 2003.
3. Most avalanches occur on slopes between 35 and 45 
degrees with the “bulls eye” being 38 degrees 
((Tremper, 2008).
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